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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
Nos. 13-1355 & 13-1356
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
JAIME LYNN SNYDER a/k/a Jamie Lynn Snyder
JAIME LYNN SNYDER,
Appellant
_______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(Nos. 1-11-cr-00097-001 and 1-12-cr-00052-001)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 9, 2013
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and CHAGARES Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 13, 2013)
______________
OPINION
______________

MCKEE, Chief Judge
Defendant Jaime Lynn Snyder appeals her judgment of conviction, and her
counsel has submitted a brief and motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons that follow, we will grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the conviction and sentence.1
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we need
not recite the procedural history or underlying facts.
Snyder pled guilty to one count of copyright infringement in violation of 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1), and she pled guilty to one count of
identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7) and (b)(1)(D) in a consolidated, but
unrelated case. She was sentenced to forty-six months’ imprisonment on both counts to
be served concurrently, followed by a consecutive sentence of twelve months’
imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147. She appeals and her counsel seeks to
withdraw pursuant to Anders.2
A.
“Under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel may seek to withdraw
from representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal if there are no nonfrivolous
issues to appeal.” Simon v. Gov't of the V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012). The
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
2
Defendant did not exercise her option to file a pro se brief in response. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2011).
2

request to withdraw “must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in
the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2011). When counsel submits an Anders brief, this Court
undertakes a two part inquiry pursuant to L.A.R. 109.2(a): “‘(1) whether counsel
adequately fulfilled [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2's] requirements; and (2)
whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.’” United
States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Youla, 241
F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001)) (alterations own).
To adhere to L.A.R. 109.2(a), counsel is required “(1) to satisfy the court that
counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) to
explain why the issues are frivolous.” Youla, 241 F.3d at 300 (citing United States v.
Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)). Although we exercise plenary review to
determine whether any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal exist, Simon, 679 F.3d at 114,
“[w]here the Anders brief initially appears adequate on its face,” our review of the record
is guided “by the Anders brief itself.” Youla, 241 F.3d at 301.
Upon thorough review of counsel’s Anders brief, we conclude that there are
“sufficient indicia that [counsel] thoroughly searched the record and the law in service of
[her] client so that we might confidently consider only those objections raised.” Youla,
241 F.3d at 301 (quoting Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781). Counsel’s brief evinces a clear
command of the record, and ultimately provides a clear explanation as to why controlling
law renders frivolous the single issue identified. That issue is whether Snyder’s sentence
is procedurally and substantively reasonable.
3

B.
“We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence for
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 566 (3d Cir. 2013). District
courts “follow a three-step sentencing process.” Id. Courts 1) “must continue to
calculate a defendant's Guidelines3 sentence precisely as they would have before Booker[,
543 U.S. 220 (2005)],” 2) “must formally rule on the motions of both parties and state on
the record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure affects the
Guidelines calculation, and take into account our Circuit's pre-Booker case law, which
continues to have advisory force,” and 3) must “exercise their discretion by considering
the relevant [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors . . . in setting the sentence they impose
regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.” Kluger,
722 F.3d at 566 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if, for instance, the Guidelines range is
properly calculated and treated as advisory, the § 3553(a) factors were considered, the
sentence was not based on clearly erroneous factual findings, and the chosen sentence
was adequately explained. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (citation omitted). “[I]f the district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will
affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on
that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. at 568.
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 1B1.1–8F1.1 (2012) [hereinafter “Guidelines”
or “U.S.S.G.”].
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The applicable Guideline range was seventy to eighty-seven months. Snyder
objected to the calculation, arguing that the stipulated loss figure of $971,935.10 was
appropriate to use for the offense level enhancement calculation under U.S.S.G. §
2B1.1(b)(1). The District Court resolved the objection in Snyder’s favor by utilizing the
plea agreement figure. See, e.g., United States v. Tilley, 786 F. Supp. 2d 862, 867. The
resulting offense level of twenty-one was correctly calculated, resulting in a Guidelines
range of forty-six to fifty-seven months. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H) & ch. 5, pt. A
Sentencing Table.
The District Court explained that it considered the Guidelines’ “advisory”
sentence and the § 3553(a) factors. The court thoroughly explored Snyder’s personal
history and characteristics, and further explained that the record before it informed its
consideration of the remaining factors. See United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 502 (3d
Cir. 2013) (“[A] district court need not discuss and make findings as to each of the §
3553(a) factors so long as the record makes clear that the court has taken them into
account.” (citations and quotations omitted)). The court properly added a twelve month
sentencing enhancement to be served consecutively for the offense committed while on
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3147. The court then concluded that it had no reason to depart
from the advisory sentence. In sum, we are satisfied the sentence is procedurally
reasonable.
Moreover, since the court appropriately considered the § 3553(a) factors and the
resulting sentence is at the bottom end of the Guidelines range, we are also satisfied that
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Snyder’s sentence is substantively reasonable. See id. at 568. Thus, as defense counsel
suggests, pursuing that issue would be frivolous.
II.
Accordingly, because no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal exist, counsel fulfilled her
obligation under Anders and we will therefore grant her motion to withdraw. For the
same reason, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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